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Tiffee v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 20 (May 6, 2021)1 
 




Craig Thomas Tiffee, the appellant, pleaded guilty to a felony and completed his 
probation. Under which the terms of the plea agreement allowed him to withdraw his guilty 
plea and enter a guilty plea to a gross misdemeanor. The district court denied his petition o seal 
his criminal record for the gross misdemeanor. The Court reversed and remanded the district 
court’s denial of a sealing criminal records petition for reasons of (1) the district court relied 
on appellant’s withdrawn guilty plea, (2) the district court misapplied the governing statutes, 
and (3) the State failed to rebut the presumption by showing evidence of activities after the 
underlying offense to demonstrate that the appellant is not rehabilitated.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Craig Tiffee lured an undercover detective who posed as a 15-year-old to meet him for 
sex. After getting arrested, Tiffee agreed with the State to plead guilty to “luring children or 
mentally ill persons with the use of technology with the intent to engage in sexual conduct,” a 
felony under NRS 201.560(4) 2 . As a term of the plea agreement, Tiffee was allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea and enter a guilty plea to “unlawful contact with a child,” a gross 
misdemeanor under NRS 207.260(4)(a), upon successfully completing probation3. The State 
cooperated in this process.  
 
Upon completing his probation, he filed to have his criminal records sealed. However, 
the State opposed and argued his felony conviction fell under NRS 179.245(6) and is precluded 




The Court reviewed the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion by 
committing a legal error. The questions to ask are whether the withdrawn guilty plea is 
implicated in Nevada’s criminal record sealing statutes, the proper statute lists categories of 
crimes that the records are ineligible for sealing, and what evidence must the State provide to 
satisfy its burden to rebut the presumption of criminal record sealing under NRS 179.2445(1).4  
 
A withdrawn guilty plea ceases to exist for all purposes and cannot justify the denial of a 
petition to seal criminal records after a subsequent guilty plea 
 
 Tiffee argues the district court erred by relying on his withdrawn guilty plea to deny 
his petition. The initial guilty plea falls under the sealing of a felony luring conviction 
preclusion of NRS 179.245(6).5  The State suggests the withdrawn guilty plea should be 
evaluated for the purpose of deciding record sealing for the gravity of the crime.  
 
 
1 By Yoosun Jun.  
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.560(4) (2013). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.260(4)(a) (2021). 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.2445(1) (2019).  
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(6) (2017).  
 
However, “when an accused withdraws his guilty plea the status quo ante must be 
restored.”6 When a guilty plea is withdrawn, it is the same as if the plea has never been entered. 
Therefore, the district court erred in relying on Tiffee’s withdrawn guilty plea.  
 
Gross misdemeanor unlawful contact with a child is not a crime for which record sealing is 
precluded under NRS 179.245(6) 
 
 NRS 179.245(8)(b) does not list gross misdemeanor unlawful contact with a child as 
a nonsealable sexual offense.7 The district court incorrectly expanded the unlawful contact 
with a child conviction to “a crime perpetrated against a child,” which the records for such 
crime are ineligible for sealing under NRS 179.245(6)(a).8  
 
 The Court reviewed de novo and concluded such interpretation was in error. NRS 
179D.0357 defined “crime against a child” and lists specific offenses but does not include gross 
misdemeanor unlawful contact with a child. 9  The district court may not independently 
interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous. “[H]ad the Legislature intended to preclude 
the sealing of criminal records relating to a particular offense, it would have expressly done so 
by including it in the list of conviction that a defendant may not petition to seal.”10  
 
Tiffee is entitled to the presumption in favor of sealing criminal records under NRS 179.2445(1) 
 
 Tiffee complied with the statutory requirements to seal his criminal record. Tiffee 
successfully completed his probation in 2012 and committed a gross misdemeanor by initiating 
unlawful contact with a child that same year. Tiffee then waited the two-year waiting period to 
seal records pertaining to his gross misdemeanor conviction, completed information needed for 
the process, and most importantly, no statutory exceptions to sealing eligibility applies. 
Therefore, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that his record should be sealed. 
 
The State failed to rebut the presumption in favor of sealing criminal records under NRS 
179.2445(1) 
 
 The State argues that Tiffee failed to demonstrate that he is rehabilitated, and the 
seriousness of the underlying offense should be accounted for. Those arguments do not satisfy 
the State’s burden.  
 
 NRS 179.2445(1) clearly and unambiguously provides that the presumption in favor 
of sealing eligible criminal records favors the petitioner and not the State. It is the State’s 
burden to rebut the presumption, not Tiffee’s.  
 
 Additionally, even though NRS 179.2445(1) does not expressly state what evidence 
the State must provide, the criminal record sealing statutes exist within a standard statutory 
scheme and must be read in harmony with the overall purpose. That is, the public policy of 
Nevada favors giving second chances to offenders who are rehabilitated, and when a petitioner 
meets the governing statutes, the petitioner is presumed rehabilitated. To rebut, the State must 
 
6 People v. Superior Court (Garcia), 182 Cal. Rptr. 426, 248 (Ct. App. 1982).  
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(8)(b) (2017).  
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(6)(a) (2017).  
9 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179D.0357 (2013).  
10 In re Aragon, 476 P.3d 465, 467 (2020).  
show that despite complying with the statutory requirements, the petitioner is not rehabilitated 
with some affirmative proof.  
 
 Such evidence must be of subsequent activities after the underlying offense. The facts 
relating to Tiffee’s underlying crime, as the State presented, do not demonstrate that Tiffee has 
not been rehabilitated for the purposes of sealing criminal records. Rehabilitation may happen 
only after the underlying offense and using the facts of the conviction as evidence cannot rebut 




A district court may not rely upon the petitioner’s withdrawn guilty plea when 
evaluating whether to seal his criminal records. Also, it must follow what the Legislature 
clearly and unambiguously provided in the statutes when evaluating whether an offense is “a 
crime against a child” or “a sexual offense.” Furthermore, if the statutory requirements are met, 
and a presumption in favor of sealing applies, the presumption can be rebutted only by evidence 
of lack of rehabilitation based on subsequent events. The district court failed on all parts. 
Accordingly, the Court reverse and remand with instructions to grant Tiffee’s petition to seal 
his criminal records.  
 
 
 
 
